ا ل م

aسوره المايده ايه27

THE role of reason; the most dangerous ideosyncrasies, to confuse the first and the last;

they place that which comes at at the end unfortunately ! for it ought not to come at all !

Namely ,the highest concepts ,which means the most universal ,the emptiest concepts, the last smoke of an evaporating reality, as the beginning, this again is nothing but their way of showing reverence: the higher may not grow out of the lower, may not have grown at allthat which is the last ,thinnest and emptiest is put first as cause in itself ,as reasonthe role allotted to the ego in modern thought is the most obvious embodiment of this inversion The ego recommends itself for such a role, because of our apparently immediate awareness of the contents of consciousness :to derive something unknown from something known alleviates ,calms ,gratifies and furthermore gives a feeling of power. Yet this immediacy of self knowledge is an illusion ,and consequently so are the unity and identity which the ego projects into things :

formerly ,alteration ,change ,any becoming at all ,were taken as proof of mere appearance ,as an indication that there must be something which led us astray. Today, conversely, precisely in so far as the prejudice, of reason forces us to posit unity ,identity,

permanence, substance, cause ,thinghood, being ,we see ourselves caught in error, compelled into error.

FOR THE UNDERMINING OF ORIGINAL IDENTITY

AND CONSEQUENTLY OF ANY COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPTUALISATION OF REALITY ,SEEMS TO DEPEND EITHER SURREPTITIOUSLY OR EXPLICITLY ON AN ONTOLOGY OF FLUX WHICH IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE CRITICAL MOTIFS FOR WHICH WE HAVE CONSIDERING THAT EVEN HERACLITUS DID INJUSTICE TO THE SENSES IN SO FAR AS HE CONSIDERED THEM TO BE THE PURVEYORS OF AN ILLUSION OF STABILITY AND IDENTITY .IN WHAT SENSE WE CAN APPEAL TO AN ABSOLUTE PRIORITY OF BECOMING,OR INSIST UPON THE INHERENTLY FALSIFYING AND FETISHIZING FUNCTION OF CONCEPTS.

THE CONCEPT OF ORIGIN IN A STRESSED OPPOSITION TO THOSE OF DESCENT AND EMERGENCE

THE ORIGIN IS THE TRADITIONAL GOAL ;THE PURSUIT OF THE ORIGIN CONSISTS IN 'AN ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE THE EXACT ESSENCE OF THINGS,THEIR PUREST POSSIBILITIES,AND THEIR CAREFULLY PROTECTED IDENTITIES THIS SEARCH ASSUMES THE EXISTENCE OF IMMOBILE FORCES THAT PRECEDE THE EXTERNAL WORLD OF ACCIDENT AND SUCCESSION.DESCENT AND EMERGENCE BY CONTRAST FORM THE OBJECT OF A NEW KIND OF HISTORY.THE QUESTION OF DESCENT IS THE QUESTION OF THE TRANS MISSION AND INTER MINGLING OF RACIAL AND SOCIALCHARACTERISTICS,AND OF THE BODY AS THE INSCRIBED SURFACE OF EVENTS',WHILE EMERGENCE MUST BE UNDERSTOOD IN TERMS OF THE NON-PLACE OF OPPOSITION BETWEEN FORCES WHICH DEPRIVES THE PHENOMENON OF ANY SINGEL SOURCE.IN ITS CONCERN FOR DESCENT AND EMERGENCE SHATTERS THE IDENTITY OF THE SUBJECT AND ERASES THE UNIQUENESS OF THE SOURCE.

OPPOSES THE CONFLICTUALITY ,SINGULARITY AND DISPERSION OF THE REAL EVENTS OF THE HISTORY TO THE PROFOUND INTENTIONS AND IMMUTABLE NECESSITIES OF THE ORIGIN.

Yet in describing the stand point of genealogy we find our self entangled in a contradiction that is similar to the one we have already encountered in . For , on the one hand , the aim of genealogy is to leave things undisturbed in their own dimension and intensity, to respect the actual complexity of events. On the other hand, that genealogy is directed against the ideal of apocalyptic objectivity : the version of historical sense

is explicit in its perspective and acknowledges its system of injustice….

It is not given to a discreet effacement before the objects it observes and does not submit itself to their processes; nor does not seek laws, since it gives equal weight to its own sight and to its objects.

It does not attempt to reconcile these two accounts: genealogy is presented as being both ‘gray, meticulous and patiently documentary’, and as being marked-like all interpretations- by an element of the coercive and the arbitrary.

The extent to which ‘ History’ can be read as a methodological manifesto ,rather than simply as an exposition of , is open to debate. However, even setting this question aside, it is clear that difficulties emerge in thought ever since the beginning . Thus in the most explicit phase of methodological reflection, describes as being committed to a pure description of the facts of discourse, despite the fact that the theory of discursive formations is explicitly directed against any phenomenological conception of pure description. The conclusion to it is the one of the few places where this tension between objectivism and relativism is explicitly reflected upon. The attempt to bypass any enquiry into the condition of possibility of knowledge runs the risk of accusations of naivete; therefore tries-without notable success – to define a status for historical description of discursive formations which would be neither that of science nor of philosophy. If you recognize the right of empirical research , some fragment of history ,to challenge the transcendental dimension, then you have ceded the main point.

The autonomy and priority of the concept and of consciousness is challenged from the standpoint of an ontology of force. However, the impossibility of justifying this ontology theoretically then leads to an aestheticization of philosophical discourse. But this aestheticization in turn requires some form of justification , and when the political consequences in terms of which the suspension of truth-claims was legitimated turn out not to be those which were anticipated , then the entire structure beings to collapse.

It has been renounced the metaphysics of libido, and has admitted that ‘it is not true that the quest for intensities or things of that kind can provide the substance of a politics, because there is the problem of injustice’.

Retained a sense of the integrity of the transcendental perspective, and of its invulnerability to direct historicist or naturalistic inversions. Challenges the coherence of conception of an empirical history of reason. The internal and autonomous analysis of the philosophical content of philosophical discourse. Must take priority over any historical insertion. We cannot write the history of reason until we know what reason is-and history alone can never tell us this, since in any historical investigation reason is presupposed. inconsequence, with deliberate provocation- that the reduction to intra worldliness of the hyperbolic ….is itself potentially a form of totalitarian enclosure no less dangerous than …

Objections are not aimed simply against direct attempts to invert the relation of priority between the essential and the factual…..

Genetic phenomenology can be seen as an attempt not to place the ideal and immutable at the origin , but rather precisely to see how idealities- such as those of geometry-emerge out of the flux and instability of the life world. In generally ,…renunciation of the view that transcendental reflection can function independently of all empirical investigation.

Seems to admit that the philosopher could not possibly have immediate access to the universal by reflection alone-that he is in no position to do without anthropological experience or to construct what constitutes the meaning of other experiences and civilizations by a purely imaginative variation of his own experiences…..

Is explicitly hostile to this softening of the distinction between transcendental and empirical enquiry. To admit that empirical facts could have any status other than that of examples for the procedure of imaginative variation contradicts the very premiss of phenomenology ,which is that essential insight….precedes every material historical investigation, and has no need of facts as such to reveal to the historian the a priori sense of his activity and objects…….makes history an explicit object of enquiry , phenomenology is able to liberate itself from history, rather than being unwittingly subject to it.

Far from opening the phenomenological parentheses to historical factuality under all its forms ,leaves history more than ever outside them.

The criticism of all the conceptions of origin . it is precisely the absence of origin –or of a telos ,its mirror-image or counterpart – which blocks the dissemination of the text. Thus the strategy must take the form of an internal dismantling of the transcendental perspective, which prevents it from performing its founding or originating role, without lapsing into what it would consider to be the incoherence of a prioritization, or even equalization , of empirical enquiry. Attempt to move beyond what it consider to be subjective idealism are close to those which to transcend the phenomenology. What is confronted is a conception as systematic self investigation as the reflexive explication of the structure of consciousness.

Everything necessarily related

to our thinking.

Every imaginable sense , every imaginable being ,whether the latter is called immanent or transcendent, falls within the domain of transcendental subjectivity, as the subjectivity which constitutes sense

and being.

Transcendental idealism claims to have found an absolute starting point, yet any self-consciousness contains a duality of subject and object , even though the object here is merely the subject reflected upon by itself. What is beyond this relation can be characterized neither in objective terms , but is rather in a state of absolute indifference with regard to all determination. Every I as the absolute substance ,a point of ultimate closure and security, whereas difference implies perpetual deferral of any such point. yet a difference which is prior to all determinate differences collapses into absolute identity, a bare concept of difference is a contradiction, since difference has to be specified. The absolute cannot become an object of consciousness, cannot be made present any more than difference.

An incessant reflection on its own conditions of meaningfulness.

Yet it can be seen not as a manifestation of inconsistency, it is only through the repeated development, and the repeated collapse, that something of the nature of impossible object can be obliquely indicated. The impossibility of an origin ,in the sense of an epistemological ground which could be made present. there cannot be a science of difference itself in its operation , as it is impossible to have a science of the origin of presence itself, that is to say of a certain nonorigin. The trace is in fact the absolute origin of sense in general. Which amounts to saying once again that there is no absolute origin of sense in general. The trace is difference which opens appearance and signification. Articulating the living upon the non-living in general, origin of all repetition, origin of ideality, the trace not more than ideal than real, not more intelligible than sensible, not more transparent signification than an opaque energy, and no concept of metaphysics can describe it.

Neither nor is simultaneously either or ,so that in the light of such passages, it is difficult to deny the proximity of differance to absolute indifferenz.

Nothing could be thinner and emptier than the difference, not simply for the semantic instability of the text, but for the movement of the world and of history in general. It is engaged in some form of parody of the philosophy of origins. Does the concept of trace or differance represent a transcendental critique of phenomenological transcendental analysis?

Is the concept of the trace arrived at by a kind of reduction of the transcendental reduction to one single constitutive principle? But then , how can a principle attained exclusively through reflection be ascribed to consciousness as the condition of its realization? Yet the absolute identity is purely negative and formal. The opposition of metaphysics have always been thought within the horizon of their own overcoming. The duality of signifier and signified, for example, within the horizon of an ultimate unmediated presence of meaning. The paradox is that the metaphysical reduction of the sign needed the opposition it was reducing. The opposition is systematic with the reduction. Quality has posed the most present problem and the most persistent block to projects of metaphysical reduction.

The qualification of the absolutely first in subjective immanence founders because immanence can never completely disentangle the moment of nonidentity within itself, and because subjectivity , the organ of reflection, clashes with the idea of an absolutely first as pure immediacy.

Subjectivity as currently experienced and construed provides a barrier against the delusion of origins. Rather, the suppression of nonidentity, the collapsing of subjectivity into pure self presence, and the compulsive features of this suppression, are the expression of a historically and socially determined drive for control. It is for this reason that it is insufficient to oppose to identitarian principle an abstract asservation of polarity. Against even the reduction of duality of origins can only be dissolved and the non self sufficiency of the subject acknowledged , in the open-ended dialectic of concrete experience. Yet the general possibility of such experience is a political question: the question of the practical overcoming of a redundant domination.